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I want to start with the declaration that I do not bring joyous tidings
on this subject which has been assigned to us this afternoon.
Before plunging into my subject, I have a word of tribute to an emi-
nent late Professor of International Law who has been referred to this
morning, that is Professor Brierly. He was my first introduction to
international law at Oxford and the first professor on the subject with
whom I studied, and he set my feet on the path which has in one way or
another marked my career since, both in government and in practice.
Sir Francis Vallat has referred to the Charter provision which makes
what I would venture to call a rather bold declaration, that the Court is
"the principal judicial organ of the United Nations."' For the purpose
of my approach, I stress the word "judicial" in that phrase. It raises
the somewhat haunting question as to where and what are the principal
executive and the principal legislative organs of the United Nations; and
of course they do not exist.
The Secretary-Generals, past and present, have seen the need of the
executive function and have, with greater or lesser effect from time to
time, taken bold and imaginative initiatives in asserting a prerogative
which the Charter itself carefully refrains from conferring upon that
organ of the United Nations. (The Secretary-General, as you all know,
is defined as the Administrative Head of the Organization.)
The legislative function is of course not allocated to either the Security
Council or to the General Assembly. The Security Council does indeed
perform a supranational function, or it can, under chapter 7. But we
must concede, I think, that in so doing it is exercising a diplomacy of
coercion that normally will be marked more by pragmatic considera-
tions and political considerations than by the application of norms of
international law.
These are not disparaging comments; they are simply analytical and
a fair analysis, I think, of the simple proposition which I make and
'U.N. CHARTER art. 92 (emphasis added).
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which I take to be germane to the subject, which is the pretension, if I
may say, that the international Organization is endowed with what may
truly be called a judicial organ.
There is some inference to be drawn from the fact that the same
Charter does not attribute to any other organs the other two major
aspects of any system of law and order, which are of course the compan-
ion functions of legislation and the executive.
Why have the nations not conferred legislative or executive functions
upon the international body? And why have they not accepted literally
and in good faith the designation of "principal judicial organ," which
they have seen fit to confer upon the Court? I think we come back here
to the question which was posed by Madam Chairman at the opening
and was picked up by Sir Francis, and that is: What is the world com-
munity? And where is the world community? Of course the world com-
munity in a governmental sense does not exist, and the nations have not
shown the slightest indication that they are prepared to act in substantial
derogation of the principle of sovereignty: the principle of sovereignty
meaning, from a practical point of view, the preservation of freedom of
action and room to maneuver. This, of course, I take to be the real
reason why judicial recourse has been so few and far between, if I may
say, and why the governments have not been prepared to resort to the
"sudden death" aspects of litigation.
There is of course no doubt-and as a practitioner I would say no
room to doubt-that the mere existence of courts is a crucial element
of any social system, domestic or international. But I would also point
out that it is not necessarily a defect of a system-or an evil inherent in
a system, if you like-that states or organizations or potential parties
hesitate very much to litigate. Litigation in our national societies is a
matter of last resort, taken when all other efforts to solve a dispute have
failed. This is a general, practical observation with which, I think, all
must agree. In my own firm, in talking with young associates who are
interested in litigation or joining our litigation department, I have
frequently proceeded from an assumption (perhaps some of you may
think it erroneous) that the best litigator is the best settler. In fact, one
of the most important aspects of the existence of a court, if I may say
so, is that the court has steps, because the greatest contribution that a
lawyer can make to a client, including a government, would be to reach
a settlement on the courthouse steps, if necessary, on the way in to the
courtroom.
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But reverting now to the reluctance of governments to have recourse
to judicial process, I believe that there are some broad principles which
may be deduced.
It must be said that the assertedly "central place" which was prom-
ised for the Court in the settlement of disputes (this phrase is found in
the Report of the Committee at San Francisco in charge of the Court
Statute), and that the Court would have a central place and the judicial
process would be in the forefront of the settlement of international dis-
putes, has not in practice been accorded to the Court.
When it came time to transform this rather abstract declaration into
a program of action, the Charter in article 33 listed (quite appropriately,
I think) recourse to the Court in sixth place, in the means by which
disputes should be settled, or attempted to be settled. Moreover, article
36 of the Charter, in what I think is significant language, merely exhorts
the Security Council, when recommending procedures or methods of
adjusting disputes, "to take into consideration that legal disputes should
as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of
Justice."
However wise and practicable so guarded an admonition may be, it
surely does not, in terms or in spirit, accord to the Court that "central
place" which the Charter, in another context, promised for it.
Let me try to gather together a few of the major deductions which
these somewhat discursive remarks seem to justify.
One must admit that the practices of the Court, which have been so
well brought out by Mr. Fawcett, do not in themselves encourage re-
course to judicial process: the expense, the time, the cumbersome proce-
dures and all the rest. We, who were involved in the South West Africa
Cases,' have good .cause to query the procedures, and reference has been
repeatedly made during the course of the day to the Barcelona Traction
Case.3 But I would submit that, as onerous, as expensive, as time-
consuming and as really intolerable as the Court procedures have been
in these two very important cases, governments nonetheless would seek
recourse to the Court and accept what a famed labor arbitrator in the
United States has described as that "consent to lose," which brings
parties in a labor dispute to the bargaining table, if the prerequisites of
a disciplined society were at all prevalent in the world and if there existed
something that could reasonably be called "a world community."
2119661 I.C.J. 6.
3Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3.
1972]
68 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 2, Supp. 2: 55
The reason, therefore, for the failure of nations, North, South, East,
and West, rich and poor, small and large, to seek judicial recourse must
have something to do with the fact that an international community, a
world order, does not indeed exist, and that looking at it quite realisti-
cally, courts like other human institutions are normally creatures of a
conimunity rather than creators of a community, although of course
they must exist in order to preserve, strengthen, and expand the sense of
community. They are, like the European Court of Human Rights and
the other courts under the Rome Treaty,4 institutions created by a
community in being, weak as it may be. The World Court is an institu-
tion of a system waiting to be born. I believe that we all must contribute
to improving and rationalizing the procedures of the Court, opening its
doors to more parties-and here Mr. Fawcett's suggestions are admira-
ble and deserve a most sympathetic study. I think that the United Na-
tions might be given a place, a standing, under this Statute as a party
to a contentious proceeding perhaps. There are amendments that might
be considered.
But I do think, and with this I would like to conclude, that the proper
functioning of an international community must inevitably be a by-
product, a fallout (if you like) of the orderly functioning of the domestic
societies which compose the nascent international order. Unless and
until our domestic societies order themselves with a degree of discipline,
with an indication of goals and of priorities which ensure that necessary
change shall take place, with justice; unless national societies order their
own internal structures, institutions, and procedures in a way in which
we come to associate with the requirements of human welfare and ad-
vancement, then no international community can be expected to be born,
because that international community will, as I say, be a by-product of
healthy, self-disciplining functioning and well-structured domestic socie-
ties. It will not and cannot come about in any other way.
So I close with what may be a gloomy note, as I warned at the outset;
these are not joyous tidings, because it is not predictable within a foresee-
able future that the Court will achieve its deserved place, the dignity and
the use which we expect of our highest national courts. But I do not think
that we should be bemused by the fact that this is not likely to happen
in the foreseeable future. We must turn our attention and devote our
I-reaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II.
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energies to the strengthening of our own societies in ways that are neces-
sary, in order to build the international community on a sound and solid
structure of national communities. Then, I think, we may expect that
the Court will truly be the "principal judicial organ" of the United
Nations and that there may even be principal legislative and executive
organs of that same august body.
